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Abst ract
This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of the
commercial loan market in which liquidity constraints arise endogenously
because of imperfect information and imperfect competition. The in-
formation and market structure generate a discriminatory interest rate
schedule and loan size restrictions, which we interpret as liquidity
constraint phenomena. The model's predictions are consistent with
actual lending policies observed in the commercial loan Industry.
Further, the lender and all borrowers are at least as well off under
this solution as they would be if faced with any single Interest rate
policy other than the competitive rate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most researchers who have assumed the existence of liquidity con-
straints when developing models to match macroeconomic data have care-
fully qualified this practice by acknowledging the need for a theo-
retical basis. We provide one such basis in this paper by constructing
an environment within which liquidity constraints arise endogenously
because of imperfect information and imperfect competition. Specif-
ically, we develop static and dynamic versions of a simple general
equilibrium model with a commercial loan market in which there is a
single lender and a large number of borrowers who differ only in terms
of their net worth, and hence, ability to repay. The imperfect
information assumption is the same as that used by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981): the lender knows the distribution of borrowers' types, but
not the identity of any particular borrower.
Our assumptions on market and information structure generate a
discriminatory interest rate schedule that matches the pricing poli-
cies observed in the commercial loan industry. The price discrimina-
tion arises despite the absence of differences across borrowers in
risk, credit histories, or loan administration costs—factors commonly
believed to explain any observed differences in loan interest rates
across borrowers. Further, the endogeneity of the liquidity con-
straints, along with the model's microfoundat ion structure, allows us
to conduct a normative analysis of such pricing policies. We find
that the discriminatory interest rate policy can be Pareto superior to
most uniform pricing schedules. In addition, smaller borrowers are
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shown to be more liquidity constrained than larger borrowers, and thus
bear a larger share of the distortion induced by the market imperfec-
tions.
The literature on liquidity constraints and the distortions they
introduce into market allocations and interest rates is proliferating.
Among the most recent publications in this area are Cox (1990), Fissel
and Jappelli (1990), Hayford (1989), Hayashi (1987), Jappelli (1990),
and Zeldes (1989), to name just a few. One factor differentiating
these many papers is the way the term "liquidity constraint" is de-
fined. Some authors maintain that an individual is liquidity con-
strained if completely denied access to capital markets; others
contend that liquidity constraints exist when individuals face
different interest rates for borrowing and lending, or when interest
rates are relatively high. In this paper, we say that borrowers are
liquidity constrained if they face restrictions on the amount they can
borrow at a given rate or if the Interest rate at which at least some
of them can borrow is higher than the rate they wbuld face In a
competitive market without distortions.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
The study of liquidity constraints has a very long history.
Hodgman (1960) is generally credited with the Inception of the "modern'
2literature on liquidity constraints. He presents a theory of credit
rationing by a rational, profit-maximizing lender In a competitive
loan market In which the risk of loss from default Is a function of
loan size. Jaffee and Modlgllanl (1969) extend this approach by
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introduclng demand factors and make two noteworthy modifications.
First, they assume that the lending market Is Imperfectly competitive,
although, like Hodgman, they do not empirically justify their assumed
market structure. Second, they exogenously assume that perfect price
discrimination Is Impossible. This assumption is crucial for their
analysis because a lender able to discriminate perfectly among indi-
viduals charges borrowers their reservation interest rates but does
3
not ration credit.
Baltensperger and Devinney (1985, p. 480) discuss Jaffee and
Modigllani's assumption of imperfect price discrimination and note
that
the question of the origin and importance of these
[liquidity] constraints [on price setting] . . .
was not given much attention by Jaf fee-Modigliani
.
The fact that perfect price differentiation is
Impossible is introduced as an entirely exogenous
element into their theory. They mention interest
rate ceilings . . . and appeal to a vague concept
of 'moral costs' and 'consideration of good will,'
which make It Inadvisable to charge widely differ-
ent rates to different customers. In a way, their
discussion returns to the point where Hodgman
started out. In that the proof of the consistency
of credit rationing with rational behavior relies
on precisely those legal, 'moral,' or 'psycho-
logical' constraints and rigidities that Hodgman
tried to avoid. . . .
One purpose of this paper is to show that imperfect price discrimina-
tion, and hence credit rationing, emerge naturally in an economic
envlronmeat with imperfect competition and imperfect informatioa.
More recent theoretical research on liquidity constraints has
focused on the role of private information. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
produced the seminal work of this type. Their model differs from ours
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in the assumed structure of the commercial loan market and the features
distinguishing borrowers. Specifically, the Stiglltz and Weiss model
assumes perfect competition and that borrowers differ in their levels
of wealth, which are private information, and perhaps the riskiness of
their investment projects. As a consequence, the Stiglltz and Weiss
model generates loan quantity rationing, where some borrowers receive
the loan they request while other observationally identical borrowers
are denied loans completely. In contrast, we obtain loan size ration-
ing, where identical borrowers receive identical loans but the amounts
received are smaller than those they would receive in a loan market
without the imperfections assumed in this paper.
Even more recently, Gale and Hellwig (1985), Green (1987),
Townsend (1988), and Williamson (1986) have developed contracting
models of private information economies in which liquidity constraints
arise endogenously . In these models, optimal allocations are derived
from various types of Pareto problems (i.e. maximization of utility
subject to private information and/or resource constraints).
Williamson's model contains the most fully developed credit rationing
analysis; hence we will compare our results with his in Section V.
However, as Green (1987, p. 21) notes, whether the allocations that
result from these Pareto problems with private information can be
supported by a system of Walraslan prices is often difficult to
establish. Consequently, we pursue an alternative approach. We
specify a simple general equilibrium model of a private information
economy and solve for the constrained optimal prices and quantities
directly.
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III. EMPIl^ICAL EVIDENCE FROM COMMERCIAL LOAN MARKETS
Our model is constructed to generate results that are consistent
with the available evidence on business practices common In commercial
loan markets and the nature of the credit rationing that occurs. In
particular, using Interest rate data reported by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System In the Federal Reserve
Bulletin
,
Goldberg (1982, 198A) finds substantial evidence suggesting
that banks use "base rate pricing" practices. That Is, they quote a
prime rate and then offer selective price concessions to certain
customers. He concludes (1984, p. 280) that
this activity appears to reflect an attempt by bankers
to be competitive with the direct credit markets
without lowering their prime rate quotes. The effect
of this credit innovation has been to allow banks to
segment customers on the basis of the elasticity of
their demands for bank credit, and to allow the banks
to be price-takers for those customers with access to
direct credit markets and to be price-setters for
their remaining customers.
Goldberg also notes that banks often make commercial loans with a var-
iable Interest rate; the loan rate on outstanding business loans is
tied to the bank's prime rate. Such loan terms (known as most-
favored-customer clauses) deter cuts in the prime by requiring lenders
to provide lower interest rates to current borrowers if they later
reduce the rates to subsequent borrowers.
The prime rate's use as a "base rate," its use as an anchor in
variable-rate loans, and its public disclosure may facilitate coordin-
ation in commercial loan markets. Leander (1990) Illustrates this
point with a fascinating description of a recent prime rate cut.
He reports that on the morning of January 8, 1990, First National Bank
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of Chicago Instructed its public relations department to inform the
news services (e.g. Dow Jones and Reuters) of its cut in the prime
rate from 10.5 to 10 percent. According to Leander, "As the news that
First Chicago had dropped the prime flashed across computer screens in
bank trading rooms and executive offices, hasty meetings were called
among credit committee officers, resulting in the cascade of announce-
ments [from other banks]." In fact, within hours of First Chicago's
announcement, 30 of the nation's largest banks, as well as many
smaller banks, had jumped into what Leander calls "the biggest game of
follow-the-leader in American business: changing the prime rate."
Citibank was the first to follow the rate cut, acting just 24 minutes
after First Chicago's action. Interestingly, a president of a
medium-sized bank claimed, "we were just waiting for the money center
banks to make their moves."
Further empirical support for our results comes from evidence on
the nature of credit rationing in commercial loan markets. Data on
bank lending terms reported by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in the Federal Reserve Bulletin (1990) indicates con-
sistently that the average effective interest rate charged on a loan
varies inversely with loan size. In addition, Evans and Jovanovic
(1989) report empirical results consistent with loan size , rather than
loan quantity, rationing. Specifically, they develop and estimate a
model of entrepreneurial choice using data from the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Young Men (1976-78); the tightness of a liquidity
constraint is a parameter in the model. They find that a relatively
small percentage of applicants are denied loans completely and that
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credit rationing Is prevalent among all but the wealthiest of the
remaining applicants. Furthermore, when applicants are rationed, the
liquidity constraint usually takes the form of a limitation on the
size of the loan made to each borrower.
Of course, the evidence just described does not validate our
assumption that commercial loan markets are characterized by imperfect
competition. There is no doubt, however, that lenders can identify
their competitors and are well aware of their strategic interdependence
regarding market outcomes. Moreover, the pricing policies observed
in the commercial lending industry match the pricing policies that
our model predicts, regardless of the market's actual structure. That
is, there is evidence consistent with price discrimination based on
loan size, with smaller loans bearing higher interest rates. The data
do not explain why such pricing might occur, but our model suggests
that imperfect information and imperfect competition are sufficient
to generate price discrimination among borrowers based solely on firm
net worth or resources available for repayment. Risk and loan admin-
istration cost differences are unnecessary in our model.
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In this section we present two models with similar characteristics
that can accommodate the empirical phenomena discussed in the previous
section. The first is a static (two-period) general equilibrium
nonuniform pricing model, and the second is a dynamic (overlapping
generations) version of the first model. Clearly, the two-period
model Is a special case of the stationary overlapping generations
model. We consider the models separately for three reasons. First,
this presentation makes clear that the overlapping generations
structure is not essential for our results. Equivalent results can
be obtained from the two-period model. Second, because most recent
credit rationing results have been obtained from two-period models,
this presentation facilitates comparison of our model with these
contract models. Finally, use of the overlapping generations frame-
work makes our model immediately applicable to the study of a wide
range of dynamic macroeconomic problems (e.g. dynamic fiscal policy,
the Ricardian equivalence Proposition, the cost of business cycles)
for which an endogenous theory of liquidity constraints Is important.
A. The Two-period Model
Consider an economy with n types of two-period lived borrowers and
a single lender; n is a positive and finite number. There are N.
borrowers of each type i, with i = l,2,...,n, who may be thought of as
9privately-owned firms that operate for two periods. Firms are
assumed to differ only with respect to their deterministic endowments
of physical good, or net worth. Specifically, each firm of type i has
a net worth of w. > in its first period of operation and w^ > in
its second period. All firms have the same first period net worth:
w, = w, for all 1; however, higher index firms have larger second
period net worth: w > w„ . Because firms are privately held,
we assume that each type i firm has preferences that are repre-
sentable by a twice dif ferentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave utility function, u[x. , x„ ] , where x is the amount of time
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t = 1,2 good consumed by the owner of the firm. We complete our
description of borrowers by assuming that x is a normal good. Given
these assumptions, the net worth pattern results in higher index firms
being larger borrowers.
The single lender in this economy wishes to maximize the profit
obtained from revenues generated by loan repayments, less the cost of
making new loans. Assume that the lender's endowment of physical
good at time 1 is sufficient to support its lending policy, and
suppose that the following information restriction exists: the
lender and all borrowers know the utility function u, the net worth
pattern, and N for all 1, but cannot Identify the type of any
individual borrower. Thus, a borrower's type is private information.
The implications of this Information restriction are two-fold. First,
it prevents perfect price discrimination by the lender but allows for
the possibility of Imperfect discrimination via self-selection
policies (i.e. policies that result in borrowers correctly sorting
themselves into groups by choosing the loan package designed for their
type). Second, it precludes borrowers from sharing loans because they
are unable to identify each other prior to receiving a loan.
The lender's monopoly problem is to choose a total rapayment (I.e.
principal plus Interest) schedule for period 2, denoted by P(q), such
that any firm that borrows amount q in period I must repay amount P in
period 2. Let R,(q) denote the reservation outlay for loans of size q
by a type 1 borrower (i.e. the maximum amount a type 1 borrower is
willing to pay at time 2 for a time 1 loan of size q), and let R.(q)
denote the derivative of R.(q) (i.e. the Inverse demand for loans of
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size q). Further, let q^ = and R.(0) = 0, which indicates that the
lowest index group borrows nothing and that the reservation value from
borrowing zero is zero for all groups. The lender's two-period
nonuniform profit maximization problem can now be stated as follows:
n
max I N.[P(q.)-q^] (1)
(qj,P(qj)),...,(q^,P(q^)) ^=1
subject to: R.(q.) - P(q.) ^R^(qj) - P(qj) for all (2)
Equation (1) is the lender's profit function at time 2. Clearly
the lender's profit is the aggregate amount repaid at time 2 by all
borrowers (i.e. the lender's total revenue) minus the aggregate amount
lent at time 1 to these agents (i.e. the lender's total cost).
Equation (2) summarizes the self -select ion constraints for all i
classes of borrowers. These constraints indicate that borrower i's
consumer surplus from choosing a loan of size q. must be at least as
great as the consumer surplus received from choosing a loan of some
other size q.. These self-selection constraints are designed to
J
induce borrowers to correctly reveal their type. Thus, the lender's
two-period problem is to choose an amount to lend at time 1, q., and
a total repayment schedule for time 2, P(q.), for every type 1 = l,...,n,
B . The Overlapping Generations Model
Consider now a stationary, discrete time overlapping generations
model with the same structure as the two-period model. Each genera-
tion t > has n types of two-period lived borrowers, with N bor-
rowers of each type and i = l,...,n. These borrowers may again be
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thought of as privately held firms who operate for two periods. Each
firm i of generation t commences operation ia its first period (time t)
with net worth w (t) > and has net worth Wj^^,(t) in its second
period (time t+1). As before, all firms have identical first period
net worth and higher index firms have larger second period net worth;
that is, w (t) = w, and w ,(t) = W2 with W2 > W2 for all i and t.
We assume that each privately held firm's preferences are repre-
sentable by a twice dif ferentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave utility function, u[x,(t), X2(t)] where x (t) is the amount
of time t = 1,2 good consumed by the owner of the firm. Finally,
X (t) is a normal good. Clearly, higher index firms are again larger
borrowers
.
There is a single lender in the economy who, without loss of
generality, is assumed to operate for all periods. The lender and
all borrowers are subject to the same information restriction speci-
fied in the two-period model, and the lender's endowment at the
initial date is assumed to be sufficient to support its stationary
lending policy. Observe that because the economy is stationary, time
notation can be suppressed. Thus, the lender's stationary nonuniform
profit maximization problem is formally the same as the two-period
problem stated in Section IV. A: maximize (1), the lender's station-
ary profit function at time t, subject to (2), the self-selection
constraints for the 1 classes of borrowers.
However, the interpretation of equation (1) is somewhat different
in the overlapping generations model. In particular, the lender's
stationary profit at time t is now the difference between the total
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revenue it obtains from loans repaid at time t by all borrowers of
all types from generation t-1 and the total cost of new loans granted
to new borrowers from generation t. Thus, in the stationary over-
lapping generations model the lender chooses an amount to lend, q.,
and a total repayment schedule, P(q.), for every period t >_ and
every type i = l,...,n, but its borrowers and lenders are members of
different generations. All other aspects of the two models are
identical.
V. THE NATURE OF THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION
The models developed in Section IV are general equilibrium ver-
sions of the Spence (1980) nonuniform pricing model. We prove this in
the appendix by showing that the models' assumptions on preferences
and net worth generate reservation outlay and total repayment func-
tions with the properties assumed by Spence. Thus, following Spence
(1980, pp. 822-823), the lender's profit maximization problem can be
solved as follows. First, observe that at an optimum, equation (2) is
satisfied with equality. Using this fact and the assumptions that
q^ = and R.(0) = 0, and making successive substitutions into (2),
one can show that
p(qi) = z [R-j(qj) - Rj(qj_i)]. (3)
Equation (3) gives the lender's profit-maximizing repayment schedule,
given the loan quantities q^,...,q . Second, the profit-maximizing
loan quantities can be determined as follows. Define M. = ) N.,
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1 = l,...,n, where M measures the finite cumulative distribution of
consumer types from 1 to n, with M , = because n is the highest
group. Substituting (3) into (1), differentiating with respect to
q. , and using the definition of M. yields
M. , N
1 ^ "i+1 ^i "1+1
(4)
Equation (4) summarizes the optimal loan size formulae for each group.
A. Economic Interpretation of the Solution
We can now interpret the results (i.e. equations (3) and (4)) for
an economy with a commercial lending Industry. Equation (4) indicates
that the loan size, q., offered to group 1 = l,...,n-l is strictly
less than the size available in a competitive market for all groups
except the largest. In particular, equation (4) indicates that the
profit-maximizing loan size for each group should be chosen so that
the Implicit marginal (reservation) value of a loan of size q to type
1 borrowers, R.(q), equals a weighted average of the implicit marginal
value of the loan to the next highest group, R.,i(q), and the marginal
cost of lending, which is one. This lending policy clearly violates
the competitive prescription that requires the lender to equate only
the marginal value of a loan to group 1 with the marginal cost of a
loan to group 1 (which is unity for all 1 = l,...,n).
Equation (4) is also essential for showing that the highest group
suffers no quantity or price distortion, but the degree of credit
rationing experienced by borrowers from all other groups 1 - l,...,n-l
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Is inversely related to their index. In particular, because M ,, =^ '^ n+1
by construction, (4) reduces to R (q) = 1 for group n. This is the
standard competitive prescription to equate marginal benefit to
marginal cost. Hence, the competitive quantity is supplied at the
competitive rate for this group. To establish that the pattern of
distortion is regressive, consider the following. In the appendix we
prove that our assumptions on preferences and net worth imply that
^,' + i(^) > ^4(1)- Using this fact, along with appropriate restrictions
on the distribution of borrower types (i.e. N.), equation (4) implies
that low index borrowers are relatively more constrained than high
index borrowers.
The final result pertains to the welfare properties of the nonuni-
form price and quantity scheme given by equations (3) and (4). It is
well known in the nonuniform pricing literature (e.g. Spence (1980, p.
823)) that for any uniform price different from marginal cost, there
is a nonuniform outlay schedule that weakly benefits all borrowers and
the lender without side payments. In other words, if the borrowers
and lender were given a choice between (i) any single interest rate
policy that differs from the competitive interest rate, and (ii) a
quantity-dependent array of interest rates, with one rate appropriate
for each group, they would all prefer or at least be indifferent to
the latter policy without coercion. This result indicates that there
exists some quantity-dependent interest rate policy that is Pareto
superior to any single interest rate policy except for the single rate
that prevails in the competitive market.
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Two other Interesting features of the solution merit discussion.
Because Imperfect information prevents perfect price discrimination,
the lender must ensure that the loan size/interest rate package de-
signed for each group satisfies the self-selection constraint. The
ordering of loan sizes so that q. > Qj-i for all i, is necessary for
this constraint to be satisfied. This condition states that the
lender must offer loans to high index (i.e. large net worth) borrowers
that are at least as large as those offered to low index borrowers.
Further, P(q)/q is weakly decreasing in q. This condition indicates
that large borrowers pay lower average interest rates than small
borrowers.
Both of these features of the solution stem from the lender's need
to ensure that each group selects the "correct" loan size-interest rate
package. In particular, the lender must make the selection of a small
loan undesirable for high index borrowers. This is done by allowing
the average interest rate to fall with loan size, thus letting larger
borrowers keep some of their consumer surplus. The lender must also
ensure that small borrowers do not select loans designed for large
borrowers. The information restriction guarantees that such selec-
tions are not made. Specifically, the information restriction
prevents borrowers from identifying each other. Consequently, they
are unable to pool their net worths to share a loan designed for
larger borrowers.
B. Comparison to the Related Literature
We interpret the preceding results on loan size and interest rate
distortions as liquidity constraint phenomena. In particular, In our
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model all but the largest borrowers are prohibited from obtaining
loans as large as they would choose under perfect competition and
perfect information, and the lower a borrower's net worth, the more
troublesome (i.e. distorting) the constraints are for the group.
Thus, the liquidity constraints bind and are distorting for much of
the population. These theoretical predictions appear to be consistent
with the empirical results on loan size rationing reported by Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in the Federal Reserve Bulletin (1990).
The intuition behind these credit rationing results is as follows.
The model consists of numerous borrowers who differ along a single
dimension (second period net worth). The price-leading lender has
market power and wishes to maximize profit. The lender knows the dis-
tribution of borrower types in the economy, but does not know the
Identity of any particular borrower. This information restriction
prohibits policies, such as perfect price discrimination, that lead
to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. However, the lender can
exploit the correlation of borrowers' market choices with their net
worth; this is done by offering a nonuniform interest rate schedule
that rations loan sizes to all but the largest group. The information
implicitly revealed by self-selection allows the lender to partially
offset its inability, because of imperfect information about borrower
characteristics, to design borrower-specific interest-rate schedules.
Thus, the quantity constraints, which we Interpret as liquidity
constraints on the size of loans that borrowers can obtain, arise
-17-
endogeaously as an optimal response to the information restriction in
an imperfectly competitive market.
It is interesting to compare our results with recent contracting
models with private information. We regard Williamson (1986) as an
especially good example of this type of model. In particular,
Williamson considers a two-period model with three key features:
asymmetrically Informed borrowers and lenders, costly monitoring, and
project divisibilities. These features generate Increasing returns to
scale from delegated monitoring, and hence a single intermediary
emerges endogenously. The emergence of a single lender who pools
loans and monitors borrowers is a well known feature of delegated
monitoring models of banking (e.g. in addition to Williamson, see also
Diamond (1984) or Krasa and Villamil (1990)). Hence our assumed
market structure is identical with the structure that emerges
endogenously In these recent theoretical models. However, unlike the
loan size rationing that emerges in our model, Williamson obtains "all
or nothing" loan quantity rationing. This result stems from an
asymmetry in the payoff functions of lenders and borrowers In his
model, which In turn arises from the costly monitoring of borrowers.
In contrast, loan size rationing is a manifestation of price discrim-
ination In our model.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a theoretical model of the commercial
loan market that formalizes the traditional folklore that lenders can
maximize profit by using third-degree price discrimination. This
-18-
prlce discrimination is a form of loan size rationing that occurs
despite the absence of differences across borrowers in terms of
default risk or costs of loan administration. It is also consistent
with the empirical evidence regarding commercial loan rates. More-
over, our analysis shows that all loan market participants—the
lender and all borrowers—are at least as well-off with the discrim-
inatory interest rate schedule as they would be if faced with any
uniform interest rate other than the competitive rate. Finally, the
paper fills a gap in the macroeconomics literature by presenting a
framework that yields endogenous liquidity constraints while being
tractable for the study of various dynamic macroeconomic problems.
-19-
APPENDIX
Villamll (1988) establishes that an analogue of the overlapping
generations model specified in this paper is a special case of the
widely-used Spence nonuniform pricing model. \ straightforward
adaptation of this argument will be used to show that the assumptions
on praferences and net worth made in Section IV imply reservation
outlay functions (i.e. R.(q) and R.(q)) that satisfy the assumptions
of the Spence (1980, p. 822) nonuniform pricing model:
S.l: Borrower types can be ordered so that for all q, R.,,(q) > R.(q)
and R^^i(q) > R^(q).
S.2: Firms can refrain from borrowing, and if they do, P(0) =
and R^(0) = 0.
Property S.l implies that borrower types can be ordered so that
for all q, R._^,(q) > Rj(q) and R. ,(q) > R.(q). As a consequence, a
schedule representing R.,,(q) as a function of q lies above a schedule
representing R.(q) and has a steeper slope. From S.2, firms may bor-
row nothing, and if they do, P(0) = and R.(0) = 0. This implies
that the consumer surplus of a borrower of type i from a loan of size
q _> 0, R.(q) - P(q), is at least as great as the reservation price for
purchasing nothing, which is zero.
Spence assumes, as do we, that the monopolist knows R.(q) and N.
for all i, but does not know the identity of any particular borrower.
Thus, it remains to show that our model satisfies Spence' s assumptions
S.l and S.2. This is accomplished In the following proposition.
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Proposltion : The assumptions on preferences and net worth made in
Section IV imply reservation outlay functions for consumption in
excess of net worth in the first period that satisfy S.l and S.2.
Proof : Let p denote the price of date t+1 good in terras of date t
good. Let q denote the amount borrowed, i.e. the amount of first
period consumption in excess of w, , and let h.(p) denote the excess
demand for first period consumption by a type i borrower. From the
assumptions that u(») is concave and that x, is a normal good, h.(p)
is single-valued and decreasing in p where h.(p) > 0. Thus, for all
q >_ , h.(p) has an inverse that we shall denote by R.(q). From the
assumptions on preferences and net worth, h. ,(p) > h.(p), and con-
sequently R.,i(q) > R.(q) for all q > 0. Further, letting
R^(q) =
J
R.(z)dz, we have that R._^,(q) > R.(q) for all q ^ 0.
Clearly, S.l is satisfied. Property S.2 is also satisfied because
any borrower can refuse to apply for a loan, in which case his/her
repayment obligation and reservation outlay are zero (i.e.
P(0) = R.(0) = 0).
The proposition establishes that the lender's problem that we
study in Section IV is a special case of the Spence (1980) nonuniform
pricing model; hence, Spence' s results apply directly. The nature and
interpretation of these results in a loan market context are discussed
in Sect ion V
.
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FOOTNOTES
1. These studies all focus on consumer, not commercial, loan
markets. They find consistently that approximately twenty percent
of consumers face some form of borrowing constraint. In contrast,
our paper focuses on commercial loans.
2. See Baltensperger and Devinney (1985) for an excellent survey of
this literature.
3. Jaffee and Modigliani (1969, p. 851) define credit rationing as a
situation in which there is "an excess demand for commercial
loans at the ruling commercial loan rate."
A. Further support for our theoretical and Goldberg's empirical
findings comes from at least two sources. Grether and Plott
(1984) report evidence of imperfectly competitive outcomes in
laboratory experiments with markets in which most-favored-
customer (MFC) clauses are used. Holt and Scheffman (1987) pre-
sent a theoretical model in which MFC clauses facilitate tacit
collusion in the setting of base (list) prices, such as the prime
rate, and make base prices immune to discounts that must be given
to all current and potential buyers.
5. The prevailing prime rate is said to change when sixteen of the
thirty largest banks change their prime rates.
6. In contrast, Berger and Udell (1989, p. 3) find that credit
"rationing is not likely to be an important macroeconomic
phenomenon." A close reading of their paper indicates, however,
that they use the phrase "credit rationing" as a synonym for
"credit allocation" or "credit control," expressions commonly
used (see, e.g. Merris (1975)) to refer to the impact of mone-
tary policy on credit availability through its effect on market
interest rates. They make clear that their data set cannot be
used to identify the type of rationing that we study: the
rationing of credit to certain groups of borrowers under all
credit market conditions.
7. Our model assumes a single, profit-maximizing lender and hence
is not subject to the Rothschild and Sttglitz (1976) non-existence
problem. In particular, Rothschild and Stiglitz note that com-
petition among suppliers of a homogeneous good may lead to
non-existence of a price discriminating equilibrium. However,
using a spatial model of monopolistic competition, Borenstein
(1985) shows that third-degree price discrimination almost always
occurs, even though equilibrium profit is zero, as long as firms
can sort buyers based on their willingness-to-pay. His work
suggests that product differentiation (e.g. different collateral
requirements, maturities, etc.) may be important for ensuring
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exlstence of an equilibrium in multi-lender price discrimination
models. We believe that price discriminating equilibria are
important (either in price leadership or monopolistically
competitive settings) because recent work by Milde and Riley
(1988) suggests that imperfect information by itself may not be
sufficient to generate credit rationing, at least when signalling
opportunities exist. In particular, on page 120 they note that
the (asymmetric) private information in their competitive loan
market gives rise to a separating equilibrium, but not rationing.
8. See, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Barro (1974),
Bemheim (1987), Hayford (1989), Imrohoroglu (1989), and
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986).
9. The notion of a firm that we employ merits discussion. Classical
general equilibrium theory treats the firm as a production tech-
nology. In contrast, a recent paper by Prascott and Boyd (1987)
models the firm as a coalition o f agents in an overlapping gener-
ations model. The agents in their model are identically endowed
and two-period lived, with identical utility functions defined on
consumption. The firm Is an on-going coalition of these agents
who produce the consumption good each period. The primary
emphasis In our paper Is on the relationship between the leader
and borrowers In the commercial loan market, not the nature of
commercial borrowers (firms) per se. However, our Interpretation
of the firm Is consistent with a highly simplified version of the
Prescott and Boyd model. Specifically, each privately held firm
in our model corresponds to a singleton (i.e. coalition of one)
in their model, and production Is replaced by exogenous net
worth, measured In terms of the consumption good. The Impli-
cation of liquidity constraints In their richer setting for
classic Industrial organization questions, such as the distri-
bution of firm size and firm growth, remains an Interesting open
research problem.
10. Because endowment patterns are deterministic, there Is no default
risk In this model If the lender Induces each type of borrower to
self-select the "correct" loan size-Interest rate package. In
what follows, we specify self-selection constraints that ensure
that agents prefer the "correct" package. Consequently, our
third-degree price discrimination obtains despite the absence of
differences across borrowers In default risk. See Azarladls and
Smith (1989) for a model with default risk.
11. In this model, all loans are loans of physical good. This
follows In the tradition of Samuelson (1958).
12. See Spence (1980, p. 824) for a discussion of constraints on the
distribution of consumer types.
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